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INTRODUCTION

In the mid-1960s the developing nations of the Third World
realized that they regularly held the majority position when votes
were taken within the various bodies of the United Nations. As a
result, General Assembly resolutions and studies and decisions
made by various United Nations conferences, committees, and
councils, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), brought issues such as the transfer of
technology squarely to the forefront of the world body's attention.
Sixteen years have passed since UNCTAD's first session recommended a study to explore the possibility of legislation concerning the transfer of technology to developing countries.1 What began as an ex parte attempt to confront the developed nations has
grown into a full-blown tripartite struggle to negotiate a compromise for a code of conduct to regulate the transfer of technology.
The three groups involved in this struggle are the Group of 77,
representing the developing nations, Group B, representing the
developed countries of the Western industrialized world, and
Group D, consisting of and representing the interests of the so* Conoco Inc. Legal Department. B.S., Arizona State U.; J.D., South Texas
College of Law.
1. Final Act Adopted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, E/Conf.46/L.28, Annex A at 2 (1964).
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cialist countries of Europe, the USSR, and Mongolia.
UNCTAD's fourteenth plenary meeting on May 6, 1980, produced the latest of several attempts to draft such a code. The
document is entitled "Draft International Code of Conduct on the
Transfer of Technology" 2 (Draft Code), and this draft will be the
primary subject of analysis in this article. The drafters of the
code face a number of problems, the least of which is the ultimate
determination of the code's legal character and, consequently, its
legal effect. This determination and other problem areas confronting the drafters, including the code's special preferences for
developing countries, the core chapter on restrictive practices,
and the objectives and principles of the code, will be discussed
and analyzed in this article. By necessity, reference will continually be made to the various approaches of the three contending
groups.
The writer will, whenever possible, point out the different positions among these three groups regarding the standards of international law that the code should embody. An example of one
point of contention is that, whereas new normative standards are
being devised by the developing countries (the Group of 77), the
existing standards of international law are being protected by the
Western (Group B) and socialist (Group D) groups.
This critique will carefully avoid any technical evaluation of
specific provisions of the Draft Code because the code of conduct
is far from reaching its final form and such an analysis might well
defeat the purpose of an overall critique of the Draft Code. More
appropriately, the subject matter of this article will be examined
from the standpoint of general comparisons and criticisms, while
including occasional references to particular provisions of the
Draft Code for the purpose of illustration.
II.

SPECIAL PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The developing countries have asserted from the very beginning that they were dealing from a disadvantageous position in
discussions concerning the transfer of technology. The 1975 Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat stated:
2. UNCTAD, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF
Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/

TECHNOLOGY,

25 (1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 773-81 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as UNCTAD Draft Code] (subsequent cites will refer to page numbers in 19
INT'L LEGAL MAT.).
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The technological and economic capabilities of the enterprises of
developed countries are much stronger than those of the developing countries. In the supplier/recipient relationship, therefore, the
weak position of developing countries is more exposed to the
strong quasi-monopolistic power of the transnational corporations
of the developed countries. Any international regulation of transfer
of technology, needs to take this special consideration into
account.3
The UNCTAD report found that the purpose of such a code
would be "to restructure existing relationships between suppliers
and recipients of technology so as to facilitate the third world's
access to the accumulated promise of mankind's scientific and
technological achievements."'
The Declaration of the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order 5 (Declaration) and the Programme of Action for
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 6 (Programme) are both concerned with "the formulation of an international code of conduct for the transfer of technology corresponding to the needs and conditions that prevail in developing
countries."'7 By means of the Declaration "the General Assembly
established as one of the main principles for restructuring existing international relations a principle in the following terms:
'Preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries whenever feasible, in all fields of international economic cooperation whenever possible.' " Several Western nations opposed
this effort, but the idea of preferential treatment for the developing countries through transfers of technology received further impetus in 1975 with the passage of the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States 9 (Charter). Article 13 of the Charter recom-

3. AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C6/AC.1/2/Supp. 1 at 2
(Mar. 25, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Report of the UNCTAD Secretariat].
4. Id. at 3.
5. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI)(1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 715, 718
(1974).
6. G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI)(1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 720, 727-28
(1974).
7. Zaphirion, An International Code of Conduct on Transfers of Technology, 26 INT'L & COwP. L.Q. 210, 211 (1977).
8. Report of the UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 3, at 41.
9. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 251, 257 (1975).
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mended that "all States should facilitate the access of developing
countries to the achievements of modern science and technology,
the transfer of technology and the creation of indigenous technology for the benefit of the developing countries in forms and in
accordance with procedures which are suited to their economies
and their needs." 10
Accordingly, special treatment for the developing countries had
become a cornerstone in the efforts to develop a code by the time
UNCTAD met for its fourth session in Nairobi in May 1976. This
meeting mandated the drafting of a code in Resolution 89 (IV)."
During a 1976 meeting of a group of experts, the developing nations advanced three main propositions to be considered in drafting a code. They proposed to proscribe certain practices to curb
the dominant position of the seller and protect the economy of
the buyer country, to institute programs to assist buyers of technology to adapt and assimilate technology, and to strive for the
enhancement of national technology development through international cooperation.12 The aims of the Group of 77 zeroed in on
the transfer itself, emphasizing a desire to protect the national
economies of the developing nations.
The fourth session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts
convened in 1977 and produced a Report18 demonstrating a divergence of views on this special preference for developing countries.
Although Group B and Group D followed the pattern of emphasis
upon special treatment for developing countries, they did so in
ways varying from the approach taken by the Group of 77.
Whereas the Group of 77 wrote detailed proposals and couched
the language in mandatory terms, Group B utilized vague proposals of an aspirational nature and adopted a voluntary approach to
compliance. 14 In contrast, Group D employed vague and general
proposals phrased in terms of encouraging and promoting various
activities, while making use of mandatory language regarding special'treatment.' 5 All three groups agreed that "particular consid10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
UNCTAD Res. 89(IV) (May 30, 1976).
Id.
UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an In-

ternational Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology on its Fourth Session,
U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/11, Annexes I-IV (1977) [hereinafter UNCTAD Report 11];
reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 453-90 (1978).
14. Id. at 27-28.

15. Id. at 37-38.

UNCTAD
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eration" or "special attention" be granted to the "least developed
of the developing countries."16 Predictably, however, the Group of
77 used the word "shall"; Group 7B used "should"; and Group D
1
inserted "will" in this provision.
Since UNCTAD is one of the most politicized of the United
Nations organizations, it is surprising to note that the text to the
current Draft Code contains a compromise based on the more
moderate, optional language of the earlier Group B proposals.
The current Draft Code uses the word "should" throughout the
text on "Special Treatment for Developing Countries."18 The
Western industrialized nations would have resisted a mandatory,
one-sided code similar to the one proposed by the Group of 77 in
the 1977 drafts, regardless of the Code's legal character.
This compromise is not a breakthrough of great magnitude. As
far as the developing countries are concerned, such Third World
shibboleths as permanent sovereignty over natural resources still
appear to be non-negotiable.' Although the developing nations
have declared that the achievements of modern science and technology must be shared and do, in fact, belong to mankind in general, the natural resources of the developing world are not viewed
in the same manner. By agreeing to use optional terminology to
set forth the special treatment for developing countries, the
Group of 77 has given away very little.
III.

LEGAL CHARACTER

AND EFFECT OF THE CODE

The Group of 77 has been consistent in its demand that "an
internationally legally binding instrument is the only form capable of effectively regulating the transfer of technology."20 In contrast, the representatives of both Group B and Group D have fa16. Id. at 18-19, 27-28 & 37-38.
17. Id.
18. A new subsection of the Draft Code provides that developed countries
should consider requests from developing countries to "provide assistance and
co-operation in the development and administration of laws and regulations
designed to avoid health, safety and environmental risks associated with technology or the products produced by it." Id. at 791. This may be an indication
that the parties are beginning to appreciate and respect each other's respective
bargaining positions and experiences. UNCTAD Draft Code, 19 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 773, 789-91 (1980).

19. See notes 5 and 6, supra.
20. Roffe, International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology; 11 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 186, 187 (1977).
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vored a non-binding instrument or some form of guidelines. One
commentator has offered the following opinion: "[I]f the prospects for a legally binding code at this stage may not appear very
strong, there is every reason to believe that the gap between the
developed market economies and the '77' is closing steadily."21
Such optimism may be premature when dealing with a topic that
is riddled with policy considerations, politics, and widely varying
ideological viewpoints.
The 1975 Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat urged the adoption of a legally binding multilateral convention that would implement the objectives of developing nations. 22 According to Resolution 89 (IV), the group of experts currently working on the
code are "free to formulate the draft provisions ranging from
mandatory to optional, without prejudice to the final decision on
the legal character of the code of conduct."2 3 This effectively
places the codifiers in a legal vacuum in which they prepare substantive provisions of a code of conduct whose legal character will
be determined after its formulation. Holding the legal nature of
the code in abeyance may have seemed like a good idea to some,
but it is truly unrealistic because the Report by the UNCTAD
Secretariat states that neither the organization nor its members
can per se adopt a code that would be legally binding upon states
without each state's prior consent. 24 Nevertheless, the Secretariat's report wishfully considers the prospects of having a multilateral convention:
[I]f the code were to take the form of a multilateral convention
(thus legally binding under international law on the parties to it) it
would remain- a set of guidelines for those states which did not become parties to it. These states could treat the code as they wished
and might, as happened in the case of other multilateral covenown law without acceding to
tions, enact the code rules into their
25
the code (multilateral convention).

This begs the question because it reveals a refusal on the part of
the developing nations to deal with the basic facts that would
arise in such a situation. If all the developing nations insist upon
21. Ewing, UNCTAD and the Transfer of Technology, 10 J. WORLD
L. 197, 201 (1976).
22. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 3, at 46.
23. UNCTAD Res. 89(IV), supra note 11.
24. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 3, at 102.
25. Id.

TRADE
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having a multilateral convention which is unacceptable to the
Western industrialized nations, what have they accomplished? No
amount of pressure will make the Western states become parties
to a one-sided treaty. For this reason, "[t]here is perhaps a
slightly better chance that universally acceptable voluntary guidelines will be agreed upon by a reluctant West.""6 A fact of fundamental importance is that "[n]o UNCTAD resolution or other action nor any treaty, agreement or code formulated by UNCTAD
has purported to have binding force in the absence of the traditional requirement of international law, the consent of the
2' 7
parties.
Prior versions of the code of conduct submitted by the Group
of 77 do not mention or refer to international law.28 Presumably,
this is due to the Group of 77's view that the code represents only
one part of the overall attempt to introduce new normative standards into international law that will favor its own positions. Included in prior drafts of the chapter on objectives and principles
was a footnote stating that the term "standards" remained to be
defined. This reference has been deleted from the current Draft
Code, 29 revealing a willingness to compromise that was not evident in prior drafts.
This leads the discussion to a consideration of whether the code
of conduct could become customary international law. The International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases"0 found that the Continental Shelf Convention expressed
concepts of the continental shelf that were unclear legal principles until the treaty codified them. The court held that the provisions in a treaty may have "a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis for a general
rule of law.""1 One writer has observed that if an UNCTAD "code
or guideline were so universally accepted as to rise to the level of
international custom having the force of international law, that
could result in the code becoming enforceable in the United
26. Primoff, International Regulation of Multinational Corporations and
Business - the United Nations Takes Aim, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 287, 294
(1976).
27. Schwartz, Are the OECD and UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding? 11 INT'L
L. 529, 531 (1977).
28. See UNCTAD Report 11, supra note 13.
29. UNCTAD Draft Code, supra note 2, at 777.
30. Judgment of Feb. 20, 1969, (1969) I.C.J. 3.
31. Id. at 43.
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States as a part of international law." 2 This would be possible
only if a consensus is eventually reflected in the final document,
thereby combining the various approaches of the three groups.
Ultimately, "if a number of nations do not accept a code, national
practices subsequent to 'adoption' will not demonstrate that the
code is viewed as a part of international law."33
It appears that a code of conduct in the form of a multilateral
convention will bind only those nations that consent to it, thereby
effectively eliminating from its scope those nations to which the
code is directed. On the other hand, if the final document assumes the character of a set of guidelines for the transfer of technology in the context of a three way compromise, it may well lead
to an international standard of customary international law that
could eventually be incorporated into national legal systems by
way of adopting legislation.
All parties to the negotiations agree that the code should cover
only international transfers of technology. 34 In addition, the three
groups agree that the code "is universally applicable" regardless
of the type of economic and political systems involved or the level
of development of the countries concerned.3 5 Even though the
Draft Code includes a provision concerning proprietary and nonproprietary technology,3 6 the applicability of the code's provisions
"should be left to the proper law of the contract or the law governing the transfer as defined by the applicable private international law rule.

'3 7

The Draft Code does not contain a negotiated compromise on
either choice of law or a method for dispute settlement.38 This
demonstrates how very far apart the groups are when these issues
are discussed. There are, however, several proposed drafts of
choice of law and dispute settlement provisions in Appendix D of
the Draft Code.3 9 The Group of 77 has proposed mandatory ter-

minology favoring the "acquiring country," while Group D would
allow parties to "freely choose the law applicable to the agree32. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 536.
33. Id.

34. UNCTAD Draft Code, supra note 2, at 777.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 778.
Id. at 777.
Zaphiriou, supra note 7, at 218.
See UNCTAD Draft Code, supra note 2, at 794.
Id. at 806.
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ment. ' ' 40 Group B has chosen the optional approach also, but with

much more specificity and evenhandedness apparent in the steps
required to determine the applicable law and to settle disputes.4
These differences provide additional support for the argument
that a set of voluntary guidelines is the only possible type of
agreement that all three groups could accept. Such a document
would, however, have no legal effect. If an UNCTAD resolution
passed a mandatory set of guidelines without a compromise
agreement among the groups, it would be equally impotent because the guidelines would be ignored by those in disagreement.
Although the only enforceable method available to implement a
workable code of conduct seems to be the multilateral convention,
such an instrument would have to be replete with exceptions, optional terminology, and provisions for derogation before the developed nations would consent to be bound thereby. This is the
legal quandary in which the three groups find themselves.
The Draft Code contains a subsection on "review procedure"
under chapter 8 (international institutional machinery). The subsection provides that:
Subject to the approval of the General Assembly [four] [six]
years after the adoption of the Code, a United Nations Conference
[of Plenipotentiaries] shall be convened by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations under the auspices of UNCTAD for the purpose of reviewing all the aspects of the Code [with a view to bringing about its universal application as a legally binding instrument]
[including its legal nature] [including the final decision on the legal
character of the Code]. Towards this end, the Committee shall
make proposals to the Conference for the improvement and further
development of the Code, taking into account relevant activity in
the field of transfer of42technology within the framework of the
United Nations system.

UNCTAD may, therefore, take four to six years to determine the
legal character of a code of conduct following its adoption. Perhaps such a long-term review will provide a cooling-off period for
the Group of 77. This could assist the groups in ultimately reaching a reasonable compromise. There is also the possibility, however, that such an extended period of time between adoption and
legal determination could serve to produce the opposite result.
40. Id. at 807-808.
41. Id. at 809-10.
42. Id. at 794.
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s AND PRINCIPLES

As mentioned above, ideology plays a tremendous role in the
development of a code of conduct. Much of the assault on transnational corporations "comes from Marxist sources or from statist
and planned-economy philosophies which today characterize so
much of the developing world."'4 The free enterprise system is
under attack, and, although some modifications of the system appear to be necessary, any attempt at international regulation by
means of prohibitions must be resisted. This is why the developed
countries maintain that it is easier to modify the behavior of the
transnational corporations through tax concessions and incentive
programs than through a code. The transnational corporation is a
commercial supplier of technology seeking an economic return on
its holdings of proprietary knowledge. 44 Since the socialist, developed countries cannot perceive the notion of such economic freedom and many of the developing countries are leaning in the direction of socialist philosophies, it is to be expected that all of
these groups would develop different sets of objectives and principles for the code.
The 1975 Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat listed five basic
objectives and principles that could be incorporated into a code of
conduct for the transfer of technology:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

The need for international regulatory action;
The encouragement of unpackaged transfer;
Improvement of access at fair and reasonable prices and cost;
Effective performance of transfer arrangements;
Ensuring
the development of technological capabilities of
45

recipients.

Most of these objectives and principles are included in chapter 2
on Objectives and Principles in the Draft Code." Unpackaging,
for instance, has been approached in chapter 247 and in chapter 5
on

Guarantees/Responsibilities/Obligations.

48

This

issue

is

43. Primoff, supra note 26, at 320.

44. Jeffries, Regulation of Transfer of Technology, An Evaluation of the
UNCTAD Code of Conduct, 18

L.J. 309, 315 (1977). See also W.
No. 13: THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF

HARv. INT'L

CHUDSON, UNITAR RESEARCH REPORT

COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs

41 (1971).

45. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 3, at 5.
46. UNCTAD Draft Code, supra note 2, at 777-79.
47. Id. at 778.
48. Id. at 785.
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fiercely promoted by the developing countries. One recent evaluation of the code noted that "the requirement that transfer of
technology agreements be unpackaged is the most feasible rule
for immediate implementation. Under such a rule, approval of a
contract would only depend upon presentation of details of components and prices of an agreement to an appropriate agency.14
Although this may be true, the Group of 77 and Group D are
insisting that unpackaging become a mandatory provision of the
Draft Code rather than an optional provision.5 0
Many specific provisions for the conduct of the parties are
found within chapter 5.51 As with many other parts of the Draft
Code, the Group of 77 puts forth mandatory terminology in hopes
of creating a self-executing document. Group D, on the other
hand, flip-flops from one side to another, sometimes agreeing with
the Group of 77 and sometimes protecting its vested interests. 2
Group B maintains a consistent approach in favor of optional
terms and reasonable restrictions." The source of the problem is
the difference in the structures and philosophies of the political
and economic systems involved. When a developing nation's government speaks, it directly represents the buyer in a transfer of
technology. When a Western industrialized nation's government
speaks, however, it does not directly represent the seller in such a
transaction. One of the fundamental challenges for the drafters of
the code is to find a way for the free economy governments to
agree on international measures for corporate regulation that
have generally not been instituted on the domestic level. If
viewed in this manner, what is referred to as a challenge might
more accurately be described as a nearly insurmountable obstacle.
In an earlier draft of the code entitled "Consolidated Composite Draft on-Objectives and Principles,"" the Group B negotiators
suggested the following paragraph:
[E]ach technology transaction is an individual case and the transfer of technology is an on-going and sequential process. Flexibility
in the technology transfer process is necessary and the freedom of

49. Jeffries, supra note 44, at 334.

50. UNCTAD Draft Code, supra note 2, at 785.
51. Id. at 785-89.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Consolidated Composite Draft on Objectives and Principles, Chairman of
Working Group I (Feb. 24, 1978).
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parties to negotiate, conclude and perform agreements for the
transfer of technology on mutually acceptable terms and conditions
should not be unduly restricted.55
Such a principle lies at the very heart of the free enterprise system, but this same principle has also been the alleged foundation
for the abuse of a dominant position by some technology sellers.
The developing countries could not agree to such a principle. It
does not appear in the current Draft Code.
The entire objective of regulation was placed in a more realistic
light by a 1976 United Nations report that recognized the dangers
of overregulation. The report feared that regulation would cause
the seller to "withhold, withdraw or transfer the investment."5 6
Since the developing countries are still in a comparatively weak
bargaining position, the Group of 77 should concentrate on more
moderate approaches to regulation by the code. The present climate of uncertainty and hostility has led one commentator to
state that "[tihere is increasing evidence that investments in developing countries are being diverted to developed ones where 'results are more predictable.' ,,57 If this is the case, radical regulatory provisions of any kind would make the code a self-defeating
instrument from the developing countries' viewpoint because
many of their most rudimentary objectives could not be realized.
V.

CORE CHAPTER ON RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES

Chapter 4 of the Draft Code contains a mass of provisions regarding restrictive practices.5 8 The effort is an improvement over
earlier drafts prepared by the various working groups simply because it reduces from seven to three the number of symbols required to identify one group's proposals from another's. Although
there is a surprising amount of agreed upon text within the
twenty paragraphs of chapter 4, the brackets and asterisks in
most of the important paragraphs subject them to tremendous
ambiguities and complexities. In addition to the partially agreed
upon text on restrictive practices, Appendix B, as attached to the
current Draft Code, contains further suggestions and variations
55.
56.

Id.

NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, Report to the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/8, (Jan. 12, 1976), at

17.
57.
58.

Primoff, supra note 26, at 322.
UNCTAD Draft Code, supra note 2, at 781.
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on the theme.59 It is beyond the scope of this paper to become
involved in the intricacies of the language being inserted by each
of the groups in this section, and, therefore, the writer will restrict his attention to the substance of the practices that are being prohibited by chapter 4.
Since the goal of developing countries is technological independence, the elimination of many so-called restrictive practices
should "encourage utilization and absorption of technology by the
recipient enterprise." 60 Nevertheless, the list of prohibitions is
viewed by many as "unduly harsh and unnecessary for achievement of the goals of the Code." 61 Prohibitory clauses on publicity 62 and use of trademarks63 do not seem to remedy any specific
problems, but are nonetheless included. On the other hand,
prohibitions concerning grantback provisions, use of personnel,
price fixing, adaptations, tying arrangements, and export restrictions" appear to be acceptable to all groups.
All of these prohibitions against restrictive business practices
have direct reference to the protection of the developing countries' economies. While these are legitimate goals for the developing countries, one wonders if there is not an over-emphasis on
technology transfers for the sake of development. One writer has
noted that "[d]evelopment means more than the structural transformation of an economy but without it, development will not get
very far."6 5 The point is that a distinction must be made "between capital goods which produce more capital goods and those
which produce consumer goods," 6 because significant development is not possible without growth. Growth through industrialization can occur only if the developing countries are discriminating in their choices of technology. These choices will dictate the
type of industrialization that occurs. The developing nations must
attain an understanding in terms of the process of the transfer of
technology because development will be frustrated "unless there

59. Id. at 795.

60. Jeifries, supra note 44, at 335.
61. Id.
62. UNCTAD Draft Code, supra note 2, at 783.
63. Id. at 784.

64. Id. at 782-83.
65. Ewing, Transfer and Development of Technology: The Problems of Developing Countries in Perspective, 11 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 7 (1977).

66. Id.
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is progressive introduction of intermediate and capital goods.167
The concentration on restrictive practices in the transfer of technology is understandable, but it is not the only answer to the development goals of the Group of 77. A set of ground rules for the
transfer of technology should be part of a long-term goal for the
developing countries in order that they may achieve an equal bargaining position with the multinational corporations. This goal
will require an organizational strategy that emphasizes the training of skilled technical personnel and administrative experts, the
supply of which is at a premium in the developing countries today. Added sophistication on the part of the buyers of technology
would naturally lead to further restrictions on the sellers, and the
relative bargaining positions of the two would approach a more
nearly equal level.
Even on a short term basis, as the developing countries "gain in
strength and ability to regulate, more stringent laws and enforcement mechanisms can be implemented."6 In the meantime, incentives and other devices for controlling the transfer process
should be implemented in order to augment more moderate regulatory provisions of a code of conduct.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Some simplistic arguments have been advanced by a variety of
sources in order to convince transnational corporations that they
should comply with a code of conduct. One such argument was
made by the Secretary General of UNCTAD, who is credited with
saying that "[i]f complied with, this [code of conduct] might
make it easier for transnational companies to operate in developing countries - replacing confrontation with co-operation." 69 As
a general statement, this is obviously true, but what is the real
price of compliance? The answer to that question will ultimately
depend upon the final form of the code of conduct. It is certain
that the interests of the developing countries will be given special
preference and treatment. If the majority Group of 77 continues
to push for extremely strict regulations, the chances are minimal
that the members of either Group B or Group D will be willing to
pay an exorbitant price for compliance.
67. Id.
68. Jeffries, supra note 44, at 342.
69.

Wasserman, Key Issues in Development, Interview with UNCTAD's
WORLD TRADE L. 17, 18 (1976).

Secretary-General,10 J.
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The legal character of the code is still in limbo. A recent commentary has suggested that "the UNCTAD Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology should be more than an umbrella for unilateral rules and regulations. It should provide a framework for
unification and standardization of rules on transfer of technology."7 ° This writer would add two specific requirements. First, the
final document should take the form of a set of guidelines acceptable to both buyers and sellers of technology. Although the result
of such an effort might be an agreement based on the lowest common denominator, it would necessarily involve a commitment
from all three negotiating groups, not just the developed countries. Second, this set of guidelines should clearly stipulate that
all parties are to observe international law and that an international minimum standard should be observed.7 1 Some provision
for the acceptance or development of new normative standards
should be included within the guidelines in order to give the developing countries a share in the development of international
law in this area. Minimum standards must be emphasized to
avoid the majority tendency to attempt to abolish the old rules of
the game. At this stage in the negotiations, hopes for such a final
result are slim. The most likely scenario would culminate in a majority vote for the Group of 77 mandatory and binding version,
which would be rendered meaningless by the refusal of the Western industrial states to comply with it.
The advantages that accompany a more moderate approach to
restrictions on the transfer of technology have been set forth in
this paper. The author submits, however, that the developing
countries need more than just the UNCTAD code of conduct for
the attainment of its developmental objectives. While the Western industrialized nations have the OECD and the socialist bloc
has COMECON, "[t]he Third World needs its own corresponding
instrument, able to service its countries in economic and technical
matters, not only in negotiations with the developed countries,
but just as important, in promoting co-operation among its members."72 This economic union could play a great role in the long-

term strategy of equalization and technological independence.
Thus a code of conduct should be viewed as a key step forward
for the developing countries, but more importantly, as a means to
70.
71.
72.

Jeffries, supra note 44, at 342.
Zaphiriou, supra note 7, at 218.
Ewing, supra note 65, at 14.
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